BloodHound Basics

Over the past months and years at $dayjob, I have done a lot of work with BloodHound to remove attack paths and improve the attack surface of our Active Directory environment. During this time I have found a number of ways to leverage BloodHound to perform what is effectively an audit of Active Directory, by identifying key attack paths and quantifying issues within large enterprise environments.

Initially, I found the more advanced query language (Cypher) to be quite complex, but it is very powerful and just happens to use a slightly different structure to other languages such as SQL.

To start, Ill generate a BloodHound dataset using the DBCreator script provided by SpecterOps. Following that, I will cover what Cypher is and explain some of its features in a later post. Finally, I will share some queries which can help to audit your environment.

For this guide, I wont cover what BloodHound is or the very basics of the program. There are other guides which already exist which do a great job of this, and the documentation is very thorough.

Environment Prep

Lets use the DBCreator script, but we will use byt3bl33d3r’s PR to fix some of the issues in the original version. This section does get a bit techy, so skip over the install section if you just want to learn about BloodHound!

I had a lot of issues getting this to work, so I simplified the usage of pickle in the MainMenu class. By changing the assignment to first_names and last_names to something simpler:

first_pickle = open("data/first.pkl",'rb')
last_pickle = open("data/last.pkl",'rb')

self.first_names = pickle.load(first_pickle)
self.last_names = pickle.load(last_pickle)

cmd.Cmd.__init__(self)

I also found the environment variables didn’t work, so I opted to clear them, and finally the group nesting function uses a hardcoded value (dept = group[0:-19]) for the length of the default ‘TESTLAB.LOCAL‘ domain name. I changed this to the value of self.domain + 6 to return the correct value & work as expected.

dept = group[0:-(len(self.domain)+6)]

The final group nesting logic is:

I will make a PR for this if I get around to it one day!

And lets load up BloodHound to verify it worked correctly:

And we get a pretty neat graph out of it when we run one of the pre-built queries – but more on this later on!

Basic Analysis

When we have our data loaded into BloodHound, we are presented with a view which shows all of the Domain Admins in the data we gathered. In my example, there are a lot of Domain Admins, so the graph is quite large!

We can click on any of these users to load details on that specific user. For example we can see that BDELUNG00508@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM is the account for Mr Brendan Delung.

We can use this to show some basic information on the user, such as their name (Brendan Delung), when they last logged in (Sat 19th November 2022)

If we scroll down a bit to the Group Membership section, we can see the First Degree Group Membership entry. This complex name is another way of saying the groups which this user is a member of. From when we first loaded up BloodHound, we know that Brendan is a member of the Domain Admins group (i.e. DOMAIN ADMINS@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM). From the screenshot below, we can see that Brendan is a member of 8 groups (including the Domain Admins).

If we click on this row, BloodHound will run a query in the background to show the groups which Brendan is a member of in the graph view. The view now shows us the groups:

Another option to represent the groups which a user is a member of is the Unrolled Group Membership, which is below the First Degree Group Membership feature we just used.

This takes the output from above, and then checks if any of these groups are within other groups and so on. Again, by clicking on the row we can see the graph which it creates, showing a further 2 groups which BDELUNG00508 is part of:

As we can see, the first ‘column’ of yellow nodes show the groups we could see before (Starting with OPERATIONS00039), but now we can see that the OPERATIONS0122 group is a member of another group (OPERATIONS00826), which itself is within another group (OPERATIONS01589)!

This shows the power of BloodHound, as running queries like this gets very complex with large environments. Whilst the output here is a little boring to us as an attacker, it becomes far more interesting if one of these unrolled groups has access which was not expected, such as local admin to a server.

Pathfinding

BloodHound allows us to find paths between AD objects easily, using the ‘Pathfinding’ option in the UI.

If we click on this icon, we can now enter a ‘Start Node’ and ‘Target Node’ – in other words, where are we and where do we want to get to.

In the context of a red team, the Start Node could be a user who has been phished, and the End Node could be the Domain Admins group (Or whatever we want to ultimately compromise), which would show attack paths to obtain domain admin rights.

We can also fill this detail in by right clicking on a node and then selecting either ‘Set as Starting Node’ or ‘Set as Ending Node’.

To show this, we will use DBERENDT00668 as our starting point.

As we type in a group, BloodHound will autofill suggestions:

After some thinking, BloodHound will show us an ‘attack path’ – the steps we would need to take as an attacker to become a Domain Admin user.

To explain the above attack path, DBERENDT00668 user is a member of the IT00928 group. Members of this group can then RDP onto the COMP01364 server. This server then has a session for MSCHIVELY01554, who is a Domain Admin user.

If we wanted to learn more about any of these permissions, we can right click on the ‘edge’ (The line between the coloured nodes) and then click on ‘Help’.

This will then give a short overview on how it could be exploited:

High Value Groups

BloodHound has the concept of ‘High Value Groups’, which represent the traditionally highly powerful groups within Active Directory such as Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins and so on. In short, if any of these AD objects are compromised by an attacker, it is very bad news! In the graph view, these objects have a small diamond on the top right of their icon.

Owned Users

Another core concept is marking users as ‘owned’, which can be done by right clicking on a user and clicking on ‘Mark User as Owned’. This does two things:

  1. Marks the user object with a little skull symbol to show they are owned
  2. Allows us to filter on ‘owned’ users in our queries

BloodHound has a number of queries to search from users who are owned – for example the Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals query, which will search from every owned user to find the shortest route to becoming Domain Admin.

I have found this feature to be very useful when combined with other datasets. For example, if a password spraying or cracking exercise is performed, then any weak accounts could be marked as ‘owned’. We can then use Bloodhound to highlight the issues posed by these accounts in a really visual way – showing just how ‘close’ a weak account might be to becoming a domain admin!

Moving Laterally

Another key use case for BloodHound is for attackers, when they have first landed in an environment and are looking to move laterally. If we assume that we have infected the DBERENDT00668@HTTP418INFOSEC.COM user, it would be time consuming to establish our access purely through LDAP or PowerShell queries.

If we load up the user, we can see that they have a lot of interesting outbound access. In the screenshot below we will focus on the Execution Rights section of BloodHound. This shows the permissions that our user has. For example First Degree RDP Privileges will show the servers where our user has been explicitly granted access via RDP.

The Group Delegated RDP Privileges will show servers where our user is in a group (or nested groups) which has been granted access to a resource via RDP. More information on how this could be abused can be found on the BloodHound wiki.

If we click on the Group Delegated RDP Privileges entry above, BloodHound will again render this into a graph for us – showing that 6 different groups are granting access to servers via RDP for this user.

Custom Queries

Finally, at the bottom of the graph view is the ‘Raw Query’ tab, which allows us to run our own custom queries in the ‘Neo4j’ language – which we will cover in my post on the more advanced usage of BloodHound. This allows us to run far more complex queries and quantify a lot of the data in AD rapidly.

Attacking Password Managers: LastPass

This is the second post in a series I have done looking at password managers. My first post was on KeePass and covered some techniques which can be used against local password managers.

For this post, LastPass will be used as an example of a cloud-based password manager. In my opinion, these managers often have better UI/UX, so are easier for non-techy people to use.

LastPass has unfortunately had a *pretty rough* history, with several high-profile breaches in 2015, August 2022 and November 2022. Despite this, I would consider it as one of the most popular password managers – so it is worth using for this post!

There are several methods which I will cover here, most of which will apply to any cloud/browser-based password manager:

  1. Dumping Saved Credentials
  2. Dump The LastPass Vault From Memory
  3. Session Theft – Browser Pivoting
  4. Session Theft – Cookies via DPAPI
  5. Remote Debugging – Accessing The LastPass Vault
  6. Remote Debugging – Accessing Cookies Via The Debug WebSocket

I was only able to successfully access the vault through the ‘Remote Debugging – Accessing The LastPass Vault’ section. With the other techniques I was able to get to a position where I believe I had the correct cookies or position, but I was unable to successfully load the vault. I suspect this is due to LastPass performing host or session checking – but it could well also be due to me needing to get better at Pass-The-Cookie attacks!

Dumping Saved Credentials

To dump any saved Chrome passwords, we can use SharpChrome with the logins /password:PASSWORD parameters. This does require us to get the plaintext password of the user, but there are many ways of obtaining this 😉

To dump other Chromium based browsers such as Brave or Edge, we can use the /browser flag. For example, we would use the following command to interact with an Edge browser: SharpChrome.exe logins /password:PASSWORD /browser:edge

One thing to bear in mind with this approach is that LastPass will detect new sign in locations, such as different browsers, IP addresses and so on – so we cannot dump creds for LastPass and login directly to it!

Dump The LastPass Vault From Memory

For LastPass to work as an extension, it loads the vault into memory – but there are some weaknesses in the way in which it does this. Notably a BlackHat talk from 2015 covers this in technical detail if you are interested.

Luckily TrustedSec have automated a lot of this with their lastpass BOF, which is covered in an excellent 15-minute demo on YouTube. The BOF is part of their CS-Remote-OPs-BOF‘ repository

To start with, I will ensure that the LastPass extension is logged in but I will not have LastPass.com open in Chrome

I will then use Cobalt Strike to list the processes and pass the PIDs for Chrome processes into the lastpass BOF.

It will begin to parse memory and dump out any relevant strings, for example the master password:

As well as credentials from within the vault:

I did find that the BOF would only pull credentials from the vault after I had specifically searched for them in the extension, though it did appear as if LastPass have altered the way in which the extension works since the BOF was written, as the parsing was a little off when I used it. Nonetheless, this is a great BOF and serves as a very useful starting point for parsing Chrome’s memory.

Session Theft – Browser Pivoting

If our target has authenticated into LastPass, we can use Cobalt Strike’s Browser Pivot feature to leverage this already-established connection, but the target would have to be using Internet Explorer 😔.

We can use FoxyProxy to route our traffic through the HTTP proxy which CS has established

After adding an exception and relaxing rules on HSTS and the network.stricttransportsecurity.preloadlist option, this did partially load LastPass, but I had issues with it successfully loading the vault.

Session Theft – Cookies via DPAPI

I then turned to dumping values via DPAPI, which was a bit of a struggle. I believe that Chrome has altered the way in which it stores cookies, which prevents some of the ‘older’ tooling from working automagically. To counter this, I went to the Chrome/User Data folder on my test lab and searched for ‘cookie’, revealing the new location!

It turns out that the Cookie DB is within %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Network, which isnt where SharpChrome looks – most other blog posts mention to look in the \Default\Cookies folder. We can use this file path in SharpChrome to dump the cookies using the following command:

SharpChrome.exe cookies /target:"C:\Users\vagrant\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Network\Cookies" /password:PASSWORD

Looking at the documentation, we need to provide this with the /statekey:X parameter. We can obtain these values by running SharpChrome.exe statekeys

We will use the value ***EC73E9 for the /statekey parameter, and will also use the /url parameter to only include cookies for lastpass. This leaves us with the final command:

execute-assembly /home/user/SharpChrome.exe cookies /target:"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Network\Cookies" /password: /statekey:YADDAYADDA_EC73E9 /url:lastpass /format:json

This /format:json allows us to export directly into the Cookie-Editor extension.

Remote Debugging – Accessing The LastPass Vault

At this point I started looking into the remote-debugging-port technique which has been covered a lot recently. I then stumbled upon MDSec’s post which covered the technique below in far greater (and better) detail – go check out their post!

I found that using a redirector and the CS SOCKS proxy was very slow in my lab, even when using an interactive beacon so is probably too intensive for real world usage unless you absolutely need to! Ultimately I used Chisel to directly connect from the target to my team server, in the real-world you would want to ensure this is way more locked down!

To start, I spawned Chrome with chrome.exe --remote-debugging-port=10999. As covered elsewhere, there is a --headless argument which wont create a GUI window, but I had serious issues getting it to work!

Following a lot of errors, I realised we need to Chrome with the victims own user profile. I didn’t have success specifying a user profile directory, but did have success just using --profile-directory="Default". I believe that this profile directory value can change depending on how the target’s environment is configured – so this might change!

Using Chromium I used the flags described within the MDSec blog post to use the Chisel SOCKS proxy inside Chrome:

--proxy-server="socks5://127.0.0.1:1080" --proxy-bypass-list="<-loopback>"

This did appear to work on Chromium in Ubuntu 22.04 – but it would not successfully load the LastPass Vault for me. Instead I used a Windows VM with Chrome to more closely mimic the target user’s environment.

To get the remote debugging URL, we need to visit http://localhost:10999/json/list and get the devtoolsFrontendUrl value.

Then we can use the following magic URL from MDSec to spawn a new instance of the LastPass vault extension:

localhost:10999/json/new?chrome-extension://hdokiejnpimakedhajhdlcegeplioahd/vault.html

We then visit /json/list to see that it has spawned a new instance

Which we can then visit in our attackers browser which we started earlier.

The demo above will replicate any actions you take onto the targeted users desktop. This is has obvious, significant drawbacks so would require some *heavy* social engineering to work if you pursue this method without using the headless mode or another technique!

Ultimately, I couldn’t get this to work in headless mode through Firefox and Chromium on an Ubuntu machine. I suspect that this is a combination of:

  • LastPass is likely doing some sort of host checking, which fails when using a different host to the target (Windows/Chrome vs Ubuntu/Chromium&Firefox)
  • Using headless mode introduced other errors
  • Lack of ability

Remote Debugging – Accessing Cookies Via The Debug WebSocket

Accessing the vault via a GUI felt like a pretty long winded and noisy way of accessing LastPass. I did some hunting on Google and found a post by SpecterOps on dumping cookies via the debug port which we were using in the previous example.

This post mentions the CookieNapper tool by GreyCatSec, which uses WebSockets exposed by the debug port to simply query for all of the cookies. This has several advantages:

  • No need to use SharpChromium or load extra binaries
  • Invisible to the user
  • Should have less latency as the attack would require less usage of proxies

Using the SOCKS proxy we set up with Chisel, we can use the tool to dump cookies:

From here, we can use the EditThisCookie extension to import the cookies. Again I had issues getting access to the vault, but the cookies did appear to be successfully dumped.

Summary

In summary, I learned a lot digging into these 2 password managers – in no particular order:

  • KeePass has a number of pretty significant design flaws, even in the latest version
  • The backdooring of KeePass via the trigger system is pretty neat
  • Scanning memory is a really handy technique for password managers and programs such as these…
  • I need to improve at pass-the-cookie attacks
    • Or just don’t target LastPass I guess ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
  • Password managers are still a very good solution, and are hugely more secure than other solutions (Cough passwords.xlsx)

For what its worth, I think LastPass (or more broadly cloud-based password managers) are the best solution for most users. They tend to be much more usable than local applications such as KeePass, which should in theory encourage end users to use it more, thus making their credentials more likely to be more secure. For more technical or computer-savvy users, KeePass is ultimately more secure from an architectural point of view in my opinion.

That being said, cloud-based password managers are a huge target for attackers and you do end up putting a lot of trust into the provider, rather than an endpoint which is under your control. With LastPass now having suffered multiple breaches, this is an area which attackers will continue to target!

Further Reading

RedTeamNotes: Combining Notes & Graphs!

Intro

RedTeamNotes started as a mini project to try and make a better note taking application than what was currently available. The big issue for me with apps such as Obsidian or OneNote was that whilst they have great note taking capability, they struggle to show how different notes relate to each other – unless you follow every link and manually piece it together.

Whilst doing CRTO, I often found myself in a position where I was trying to achieve an objective but would struggle to remember all of the various ways of achieving this. For example, to move laterally, I would likely remember that I could:

  • Dump LSASS to obtain AES256 keys
  • Obtain the plaintext password and perform overpass-the-hash
  • Use Rubeus to monitor for TGTs using the /monitor command

But would I remember that I could also use the following?

  • NTLM Relaying, if I have control of an device with unconstrained delegation
  • ADCS to obtain a certificate, then leverage THEFT5
  • And several other options..

Dun Dun Dun

So I decided to build my own note taking application – RedTeamNotes!

I had a few aims for this tool:

  • It should be possible to reuse the notes in other applications.
    • i.e. Use JSON
  • Try to avoid dependencies on too many tools just to build the application
    • I don’t want to have to download Node and 100 dependencies if I want to play around in HackTheBox
  • The relationships between notes should be very clear

With a few known limitations:

  • The tool wont handle editing the notes or relationships
  • The notes will be intentionally quite brief and will mainly signpost other resources

After many changes, I ended up choosing a few great JavaScript libraries to help me out. The graphing UI is handled by Drawflow. Positioning the various nodes turned out to be one of the hardest parts of the project, as it is very easy to know what the correct graph looks like, but it is very hard to actually implement in an automated way from my experience! Luckily I found Dagre’s GraphLib, which I believe uses the ‘Dagre’ algorithm to sort the nodes, but this might well be wrong!

Aside from these two libraries, the rest was blood, sweat, tears and swearing at CSS selectors.

On the right, we can view information on our selected technique, which currently supports:

  • Description
  • OPSEC considerations
  • Links
  • Code examples
  • Defensive guidance

This data would be represented with the following JSON:

"constrained_delegation" : {
    "name": "Constrained Delegation",
    "description": "Constrained delegation is a feature of AD which allows a service to act on behalf of another user to specific other services. If we can compromise a service with constrained delegation enabled, we can potentially steal cached TGTs",
    "opsec" : ["Make sure the msdspn value (If using Rubeus) is a valid SPN which we can delegate to, only specific SPNs will be allowed."],
    "code_examples": [
        {
            "description" : "Find machines with uncontrained delegation enabled via BloodHound",
            "code" : "MATCH (c:Computer), (t:Computer), p=((c)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(t)) RETURN p"
        },
        {
            "description" : "Find machines with constrained delegation enabled via LDAP",
            "code" : "(&(objectCategory=computer)(msds-allowedtodelegateto=*))"
        },
        {
            "description" : "Find SPNs we can delegate to via PowerView",
            "code" : "Get-DomainComputer -Identity PC_NAME | Select-Object -Expandproperty msds-allowedtodelegateto"
        }
    ],
    "links" : ["https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/delegating-like-a-boss-abusing-kerberos-delegation-in-active-directory/"]
}

Using our earlier example of pass-the-ticket, we can see how this is represented below. Notice the 6 lines leading into the left of ‘Pass The Ticket’, showing 6 techniques which could get us to that position.

I decided to make a node for some of the ‘tactics’ (As MITRE ATT&CK would refer to them), which helps Dagre to better position the nodes. This has the added benefit of being able to help me perform a pseudo-checklist when I am stuck on a machine.

For example, below are a set of the privilege escalation techniques I have currently added into the tool:

The tool also can handle quite a lot of nodes. Especially considering that the relationships are quite complex, there is no caching, and it is not a super-efficient algorithm!

Searching

The tool has a search bar which will query the title and description of all the nodes on the current page, which is performed using FuzzySort. For example, lets look for techniques related to ‘tgt’:

We can then click on the top item “Dump TGT’s” and be taken to the relevant node

We can also switch between multiple datasets. For now, I currently have 3 datasets within my notes:

With code samples, we can click on the clipboard emoji, and the example text will be copied to the clipboard.

Get-DomainGPO | Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? { $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match "WriteProperty|WriteDacl|WriteOwner" -and $_.SecurityIdentifier -match "S-1-5-21-SID_GOES_HERE-[d]{4,10}" } | select ObjectDN, ActiveDirectoryRights, SecurityIdentifier | fl

Summary

Hopefully this serves as some inspiration as to what can be done to make note-taking a bit more user-friendly and usable. I’m hoping to develop this idea into a few other directions in the coming weeks and months, as I think this style of program could be useful for a few other applications!